THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF
Application no.
33747/96
by Dawn BROMILEY
against the United Kingdom
The European
Court of Human Rights (Third Section) sitting on 23 November 1999 as a Chamber
composed of
Mr J.-P. Costa, President,
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
Mr L. Loucaides,
Mr P. Kuris,
Mr W. Fuhrmann,
Mrs H.S. Greve,
Mr K. Traja, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar;
Having regard to
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms;
Having regard to
the application introduced on 14 November 1995 by Dawn Bromiley against the
United Kingdom and registered on 12 November 1996 under file no. 33747/96;
Having regard to
the reports provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having regard to
the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 19 December 1997 and
the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 30 March 1998;
Having
deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is
a British citizen and the mother of Suzanne Bromiley who was murdered on 29
October 1991. The applicant is represented before the Court by Mr A. McCooey, a
solicitor practising in Sittingbourne, Kent.
The facts of the
case as they have been submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.
On 28 October
1991 the applicant's daughter was murdered by K.W., a prisoner serving a
sentence of imprisonment for kidnapping a woman at knife point, after he had
absconded whilst on home leave.
K.W. had been
convicted in June of 1990 of kidnapping and was sentenced to a period of
imprisonment of 30 months. No application had been made for him to be dealt with
under the Mental Health Act 1983. He was classified as a category C prisoner,
which is a relatively low security risk. No mention was made of dangerousness in
his sentencing report.
A psychiatrist’s
report dated 18 July 1990 addressed to the Parole Board just after his sentence
described K.W. as follows:
“In my opinion,
<K.W.> is not suffering from any psychiatric illness. He is articulate,
intelligent and plausible. He is a recidivist and an anti social psychopath who
has made a positive choice to live a life of crime. He is not likely to benefit
from any psychiatric intervention and has no motivation to do so.”
K.W. was
originally detained at Featherstone prison. In January 1991 he was allowed home
for a period of 3 days’ leave. In the spring of 1991 he was transferred to
Lancaster prison, and was again allowed a period of home leave. Prior to each
period of home leave K.W. was examined by a medical practitioner. On both these
occasions he returned to prison at the end of the period of home leave.
In May 1991 K.W.
was transferred to Risley prison. On 6 June 1991 he was released on home leave,
and was due to return on 11 June. He failed to return. K.W. would have been
finally released on 29 August 1991, but had not been recaptured by that date. On
28 October 1991, K.W. killed Susan Bromiley.
The Government
state that the local police force was informed that K.W. had failed to return
within four hours, and that this is in accordance with the relevant Home Office
guidelines. They state that details of K.W. were recorded on the Police National
Computer, and that his details were circulated to all police forces as an
absconder.
At Hove Crown
Court on 27 November 1992 K.W. pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of
diminished responsibility. Domestic law only allows such a plea where there is
“clear evidence of mental instability”.
Consequent on the loss of her daughter in horrific circumstances, the applicant
suffered psychological damage associated with symptoms of continuing depression,
nightmares and suicidal thoughts. She has been incapable of working following
her daughter's murder, and as a consequence her home has been repossessed.
In 1994 the
applicant commenced proceedings in the High Court against the Home Office in
respect of the psychological damage she had suffered, alleging negligence on the
part of the prison authorities in releasing K.W., when there was evidence
available to the prison authorities that he was a psychopath and a danger to the
public; in failing to take adequate steps to see that he returned from home
leave; and thereafter in failing to take adequate steps to ensure his recapture,
principally in failing to notify the police that K.W. had absconded or to see
that the same was recorded on the Police National Computer.
On 18 May 1995,
the proceedings were struck out by a Master of the High Court on application by
the Home Office as showing no reasonable cause of action. The skeleton argument
placed before the Master on behalf of the Home Office argued that there was no
duty of care owed by the police to individual members of the public in respect
of criminals at large, and that as a matter of public policy the police were
immune from such actions.
There is no
written court record of the reasons given by Master Murray in striking out the
case. The applicant states that the action was struck out on the basis of a
settled line of authority within English law that a public authority with a duty
to detain offenders owes no duty of care at common law to protect the general
public from injury by dangerous or violent offenders prematurely discharged or
insecurely detained by them.
The Government
state that “it appears … the claim was dismissed because neither the applicant
nor her daughter had any reasonable prospect of satisfying the first two stages
of the duty of care test: foreseeability of harm and proximity”. They have
provided a note by the Government lawyer who attended the hearing, which stated
that the Master in striking out the claim accepted the submission that there was
no duty of care on the part of the Home Office in these circumstances and took
into account other difficulties in that the action should vest in the deceased’s
estate and was time-barred. Though no judgment as such was delivered, it was
thought that the Master was impressed by the arguments on remoteness and public
policy.
On 10 July 1996
counsel advised that English law recognises no duty of care on the part of the
Home Office to the general public at large to protect them from the foreseeable
consequences of a negligent failure to detain or re-detain a convicted prisoner
on grounds of public policy, other than where the particular victim could have
been identified before the event.
1. Criminal Law
Manslaughter
The offence of
manslaughter is committed if the victim is unlawfully killed by a person who, by
reason of abnormality of mind, suffered from diminished responsibility – i.e.
who suffered from such abnormality of mind as substantially impaired his mental
responsibility for his acts. The sentence of manslaughter is imprisonment for
life or for any shorter term.
2. The Mental
Health Act 1983
Following
conviction for an offence punishable with imprisonment, both the Magistrates’
Court and the Crown Court have the power under section 38(1) to make an interim
hospital order, where:
“… the court before or
by which he is convicted is satisfied, on the written or oral evidence of two
registered medical practitioners:
(a) that the offender
is suffering from mental illness, psychopathic disorder, severe mental
impairment or mental impairment; and
(b) that there is
reason to suppose that the mental disorder from which the offender is suffering
is such that it may be appropriate for a hospital order to be made in his case …
.”
Pursuant to
section 37(2), both the Magistrates’ Court and the Crown Court may also admit an
offender to a hospital if:
“(a) the court is
satisfied, on the written or oral evidence of two registered medical
practitioners, that the offender is suffering from mental illness, psychopathic
disorder, severe mental impairment or mental impairment and that …
(i) the mental disorder
from which the offender is suffering is of a nature or degree which makes it
appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment and, in
the case of psychopathic disorder or mental impairment, that such treatment is
likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of his condition …
(b) the court is of the
opinion, having regard to all the circumstances including the nature of the
offence and the character and antecedents of the offender, and to the other
available methods of dealing with him, that the most suitable method of
disposing of the case is by means of an order under this section.”
3. Actions
against the police for negligence
In the case of
Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. the Home Office (1970 A.C. 1004), the owners of a yacht
damaged by Borstal boys who had escaped from the supervision of prison officers
sought to sue the Home Office alleging negligence by the prison officers. The
House of Lords held that in the particular case a duty of care could arise. Lord
Diplock said:
“I should
therefore hold that any duty of a Borstal officer to use reasonable care to
prevent a Borstal trainee from escaping from his custody was owed only to
persons whom he could reasonably foresee had property situated in the vicinity
of the place of detention of the detainee which the detainee was likely to steal
or to appropriate and damage in the course of eluding immediate pursuit and
capture.”
In the case of
Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1989 A.C. 53), the mother of a victim
of the Yorkshire Ripper instituted proceedings against the police alleging that
they had failed properly to exercise their duty to exercise all reasonable care
and skill to apprehend the perpetrator of various murders and to protect members
of the public who might be his victims. Lord Keith in the House of Lords found:
“The alleged negligence
of the police consists in a failure to discover his identity. But if there is no
general duty of care owed to individual members of the public by the responsible
authorities to prevent the escape of a known criminal or to recapture him, there
cannot reasonably be imposed upon any police force a duty of care similarly to
identify and apprehend an unknown one. Miss Hill cannot for this purpose be
regarded as a person at special risk simply because she was young and female.
Where the class of potential victims of a particular habitual criminal is a
large one, the precise size of it cannot in principle affect the issue. All
householders are potential victims of an habitual burglar and all females those
of an habitual rapist. The conclusion must be that although there existed
reasonable foreseeability of likely harm to Miss Hill if Sutcliffe were not
identified and apprehended, there is absent from the case any such ingredient or
characteristic as led to the liability of the Home Secretary in the Dorset Yacht
case. Nor is there present any additional characteristic such as might make up a
deficiency. The circumstances of the case are therefore not capable of
establishing a duty of care owed towards Miss Hill by the West Yorkshire
Police.”
While he
considered this sufficient to dispose of the appeal, Lord Keith went on to set
out public policy objections to the existence of an action in negligence against
the police in the performance of their duties in the investigation and
suppression of crime.
“Potential existence of
such liability may in many instances be in the general public interest, as
tending towards the observance of a higher standard of care in the carrying on
of various different types of activity. I do not, however, consider that this
can be said of police activities. The general sense of public duty which
motivates police forces is unlikely to be appreciably reinforced by the
imposition of such liability so far as concerns their function in the
investigation and suppression of crime. From time to time they make mistakes in
the exercise of that function, but it is not to be doubted that they apply their
best endeavours to the performance of it. In some instances the imposition of
liability may lead to the exercise of a function being carried on in a
detrimentally defensive frame of mind. The possibility of this happening in
relation to the investigative operations of the police cannot be excluded.
Further it would be reasonable to expect that if potential liability were to be
imposed it would be not uncommon for actions to be raised against police forces
on the ground that they had failed to catch some criminal as soon as they might
have done, with the result that he went on to commit further crimes. While some
such actions might involve allegations of a simple and straightforward type of
failure – for example that a police officer negligently tripped and fell while
pursuing a burglar – others would be likely to enter deeply into the general
nature of a police investigation, as indeed the present action would seek to do.
The manner of conduct of such an investigation must necessarily involve a
variety of decisions to be made on matters of policy and discretion, for example
as to which particular line of inquiry is most advantageously to be pursued and
what is the most advantageous way to deploy the available resources. Many such
decisions would not be regarded by the courts as appropriate to be called in
question, yet elaborate investigation of the facts might be necessary to
ascertain whether or not this was so. A great deal of police time, trouble and
expense might be expected to have to be put into the preparation of the defence
to the action and the attendance of witnesses at the trial. The result would be
significant diversion of police manpower and attention from their most important
function, that of the suppression of crime. Closed investigations would require
to be reopened and retraversed, not with the object of bringing any criminal to
justice but to ascertain whether or not they had been competently conducted.”
Lord Templeman
commented:
“... if this action
lies, every citizen will be able to require the court to investigate the
performance of every policeman. If the policeman concentrates on one crime, he
may be accused of neglecting others. If the policeman does not arrest on
suspicion a suspect with previous convictions, the police force may be held
liable for subsequent crimes. The threat of litigation against a police force
would not make a policeman more efficient. The necessity for defending
proceedings, successfully or unsuccessfully, would distract the policeman from
his duties.
This action is
misconceived and will do more harm than good.”
In Swinney and
another v. the Chief Constable of Northumbria [1997] Q.B. 464, the plaintiff had
passed on information in confidence to the police about the identity of a person
implicated in the killing of a police officer, expressing her concern that she
did not want the source of the information to be traced back to her. The
information was recorded, naming the plaintiff, in a document which was left in
an unattended police vehicle, which was broken into with the result that the
document was stolen, came into the possession of the person implicated and the
plaintiff was threatened with violence and arson and suffered psychiatric
damage. The plaintiff’s claim in negligence against the police was struck out,
but allowed on appeal by the High Court judge. The Chief Constable appealed
contending that the police owed no duty of care, or alternatively that public
policy precluded the prosecution of the claim since the police were immune for
claims arising out of their activities in the investigation or suppression of
crime. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
In his judgment
Lord Justice Hirst referring to the cases of Dorset Yacht and Hill stated that
he could not accept a claim of blanket immunity for the police, but that there
were other considerations of public policy in that case, namely, the need to
protect springs of information, to protect informers and to encourage them to
come forward. On the facts of the case, it was arguable that the police had
assumed a responsibility of confidentiality towards the plaintiff. The case
should therefore proceed to trial.
Lord Justice Ward
held that it was arguable that:
“There is a special
relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant, which is sufficiently
proximate. Proximity is shown by the police assuming responsibility, and the
plaintiffs relying upon that assumption of responsibility, for preserving the
confidentiality of the information which, if it fell into the wrong hands, was
likely to expose the first plaintiff and members of her family to a special risk
of damage from the criminal acts of others, greater than the general risk which
ordinary members of the public must endure with phlegmatic fortitude.
It is fair, just and
reasonable that the law should impose a duty, there being no overwhelming
dictate of public policy to exclude the prosecution of this claim. On the one
hand there is, as more fully set out in Hill v. the Chief Constable ... an
important public interest that the police should carry out their difficult
duties to the best of their endeavours without being fettered by, or even
influenced by, the spectre of litigation looming over every judgment they make,
every discretion they exercise, every act they undertake or omit to perform, in
their ceaseless battle to investigate and suppress crime. The greater good
rightly outweighs any individual hardship. On the other hand it is
incontrovertible that the fight against crime is daily dependent upon
information fed to the police by members of the public, often at real risk of
villainous retribution from the criminals and their associates. The public
interest will not accept that good citizens should be expected to entrust
information to the police without also expecting that they are entrusting their
safety to the police. The public interest would be affronted were it to be the
law that members of the public should be expected, in the execution of public
service, to undertake the risk of harm to themselves without the police, in
return, being expected to take no more than reasonable care to ensure that the
confidential information imparted to them is protected ... .”
The police have
been held liable in negligence or failure in their duties in other cases. In
Kirkham v. the Chief Constable of Manchester ([1989] 2 Queen’s Bench Reports p.
283), the Court of Appeal upheld a finding of liability in negligence under the
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 where the police had taken a man into custody, knew he
was a suicide risk but did not communicate that information to the prison
authorities. The man, diagnosed as suffering from clinical depression committed
suicide in the remand prison. The police, which had assumed responsibility for
the man, had owed a duty of care, which they had breached with the result that
his death had ensued.
In Rigby and
another v. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire ([1985] 2 All E.R. 986), the High
Court found the police liable to pay damages for negligence in that they had
fired a gas canister into the plaintiffs’ premises in order to flush out a
dangerous psychopath. There had been a real and substantial fire risk in firing
the canister into the building and that risk was only acceptable if there was
fire-fighting equipment available to put the fire out at an early stage. No
equipment had been present at the time and the fire had broken out and spread
very quickly. Negligence was also found in Knightley v. Johns and others ([1982]
1 All E.R. 301) where a police inspector at the site of an accident failed to
close a tunnel and ordered officers to go back through the tunnel in the face of
traffic, thereby leading to a further accident.
In R. v. Dytham
(1979) 1 Q.B. 722, where a police officer stood by while a man died outside a
club in a murderous assault, the conviction of the officer for wilful neglect to
perform a duty was upheld.
4. Prisoners’ home Leave
The system of
home leave that was in operation at the time was governed by rule 6 of the
Prison Rules 1964 (S.I. 1964/388). At the relevant time, rule 6 provided as
follows:
“(1) A prisoner to whom this rule applies may be temporarily released for any period or periods and subject to any conditions.
(2) A prisoner may be temporarily released under this rule for any special purpose or to enable him to engage in employment to receive instruction or training or to assist him in his transition from prison life to freedom.
(3) A prisoner released under this rule may be recalled to prison at any time whether the conditions of his release have been broken or not.
(4) This rule applies
to prisoners other than persons committed to custody for trial or to be
sentenced or otherwise dealt with before or by the Crown Court or remanded in
custody by any court.”
A prison governor
exercising his discretion under rule 6, and considering an application for home
leave, had to do so in accordance with the relevant circular instruction to
governors. The relevant circular instruction states that prisoners considered to
be mentally ill or suffering from mental disorder were ineligible for home
leave; that the prisoner’s behaviour was “an important factor” in deciding
whether to grant leave and that applications were to be judged in the light of
whether the prisoner could be trusted not to commit further offences and to
return on time.
1. The applicant
complains of a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. She submits that the
action of the prison authorities in permitting K.W., who was known to be violent
and a risk to the public, out on home leave and thereafter in failing to take
any adequate steps to see that he was recaptured following his failure to
return, amount to a failure by the State to take appropriate steps to safeguard
her daughter's life. The applicant further submits that the deprivation of her
right to pursue civil proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 2 of the
Convention.
2. The applicant also
complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she has been deprived of
her right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of her civil rights
in that, in circumstances such as her claim, the Home Office is immune from
liability.
3. Finally, the
applicant complains that the deprivation of her right to pursue civil
proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
The application
was introduced on 14 November 1995 and registered on 12 November 1996.
On 8 September
1997, the European Commission of Human Rights decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government.
The Government’s
written observations were submitted on 19 December 1997 after an extension in
the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The applicant replied on 30 March 1997,
also after an extension of the time-limit.
On 13 March 1998,
the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.
On 1 November
1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the
case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that
Protocol.
On 14 December
1998, the Government provided a document.
1. The applicant
complains that State failed to protect her daughter’s life, invoking Article 2
of the Convention, which provides in its first sentence:
“1. Everyone's
right to life shall be protected by law. ...”
The Government
have submitted that any positive obligation to take preventive steps to protect
life is not absolute but depends on the nature and imminence of the risk and the
means available to combat that risk. In this case, there was no specific person
or group of persons who could have been identified as being at risk from K.W.
and no indication that the applicant’s daughter was in any foreseeable danger
from him. They emphasise that K.W. had not been found to be suffering from any
mental illness at his trial or prior to the home leave in June 1991. He had also
returned to prison after two previous periods of home leave and no incidents had
occurred to suggest that he presented a continued serious threat to the public.
When K.W. failed to return on 11 June 1991 immediate steps were taken in
accordance with the guidelines, including notification of the police and the
inclusion of his details in the Police National Computer, which would have
reached every police force in the country. In these circumstances, the
authorities did not fail to comply with any obligation imposed on them under
this provision of the Convention.
The applicant
submits that there was a positive duty on the State to protect her daughter’s
life, which included the duty not to release prematurely those who constituted a
risk to the life and limb of the public in general. In her submission, any
citizen who died because of a failure to perform that duty suffered an
interference with his or her right to life. K.W. was serving a sentence for a
serious offence and was clearly a violent and dangerous offender. Evidence was
available at the time of his release which showed that he was a psychopath and a
danger to the public. The applicant further submits that the deprivation of her
right to pursue civil proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 2 of the
Convention.
The Court recalls
that the recent case-law of the Convention organs establishes that Article 2 is
not exclusively concerned with intentional killing resulting from the use of
force by agents of the State, but also imposes a positive obligation to take
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see
eg. Osman v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
1998-VIII, § 115). The scope of the obligation will depend on the circumstances
of the case, bearing in mind, amongst other relevant considerations, the
operational choices that have to be made in terms of priorities and resources
and the necessity of interpreting such an obligation in a way which does not
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. For example,
in the Osman case (op. cit, § 116), the Court held that Article 2 imposed
a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to protect
an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of another
individual. This obligation would not be met where it was established that the
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real
and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from
the criminal acts of a third party and they failed to take measures within the
scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to
avoid that risk.
Applying that
approach in the present case, the Court observes that there is no evidence in
the file before it indicating that the authorities knew, or ought to have known,
that K.W. was likely to commit a crime of violence if he was released for a
period of home leave. It notes in that regard the absence of any medical
diagnosis of mental illness indicating that K.W. posed a risk to life and the
fact that he had previously returned from two periods of home leave without
incident. Equally, there were no elements which would have put the authorities
on notice that, in the event of K.W.’s failure to return from home leave, the
applicant’s daughter would have been at foreseeable risk. Nor is it apparent
that the authorities failed to take any step, reasonably available to them,
which would have secured K.W.’s capture before he committed a further crime. The
Court does not find, in the circumstances of this case, that the release of K.W.
on home leave, shortly before the end of his sentence, discloses by itself a
failure to protect the life of the applicant’s daughter.
Insofar as the
applicant complains of lack of access to court for taking civil proceedings in
respect of her daughter’s death, the Court considers that this falls to be
examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court finds
therefore that the applicant’s complaints under Article 2 are unsubstantiated
and must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
2. The applicant
complains that she has been unable to bring civil proceedings against the
authorities in respect of their alleged responsibility for the death of her
daughter, invoking Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides as relevant in
its first sentence:
“In the determination
of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”
The Government
argue that the applicant has not been denied access to court in the
determination of any civil right existing in domestic law. They submit that the
applicant’s case was dismissed by the courts on the basis of ordinary principles
of negligence law. Her claim was struck out by reference, in particular, to its
failure to fulfil the requirements of proximity and foreseeability, which are
necessary to establish a duty of care on the part of the authorities. Any
restriction on access to court deriving from such considerations pursued both a
legitimate aim and was proportionate.
The applicant submits that there has been a limitation on her access to court
as the Home Office is only liable in negligence when a foreseeable individual is
injured or killed as a result of a dangerous prisoner’s premature discharge.
This restricts the liability of the Home Officer even when its negligence is
clear and causative of loss. Though the reason for the court striking out the
applicant’s claim in this case is not clear, it appears to be based on the fact
that it was unprecedented to hold the authorities liable in such circumstances.
To the extent that this protects the state from liability for inappropriate
release decisions, this confers an immunity on the State which violates Article
6 of the Convention.
The Court recalls
that the operation of an immunity from action imposed by domestic courts in
respect of damage caused by the negligence of public authorities may disclose a
restriction on access to court contrary to Article 6 of the Convention (see
Osman v. the United Kingdom judgment, op. cit., §§ 138-139). In the Osman
case (op. cit.) a restriction on liability in negligence arising out of
an alleged failure of the police to protect the applicants from death and
serious injury was found to disclose such a breach, where the applicants’ claims
were struck out due to a public policy immunity attaching to the police in
respect of their investigative and preventative functions. In the present case,
the Court notes that the applicant’s claims in negligence against the prison
authorities and Home Office were struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of
action. Though there is no written record of the judge’s reasons for doing so,
the Court accepts the Government’s submissions that this was based, principally,
on the lack of foreseeability or proximity, namely, that the killing of the
applicant’s daughter was too remote and unforeseeable a consequence of the
alleged negligence of the authorities in permitting the release of K.W. from
prison on home leave, and that consequently no duty of care arose which those
authorities could be found liable for breaching. This accords with the general
principles set out in domestic case-law and discloses no operation of a specific
immunity from liability on public policy grounds as was in issue in the Osman
case.
Accordingly, the
Court finds that the applicant cannot claim that she was denied access to court
in the determination of any of her civil rights by the operation of an immunity
or other bar. This part of the application must therefore be rejected as
manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. Finally, the
applicant has invoked Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees, inter
alia, the right to respect for private and family life, submitting that
this provision is infringed by her inability to pursue civil proceedings. Having
regard to its findings above under Articles 2 and 6 of the Convention, the Court
finds that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these
reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE
APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
Registrar President