KUDŁA - Poland (N˚ 30210/96)
Judgment 26.10.2000 [Grand Chamber]

Facts: The applicant was detained on remand in August 1991. After numerous requests for release had been refused, the detention order was finally quashed in June 1992, on the basis of a psychiatric report which stated that the applicant showed persistent suicidal tendencies. The applicant subsequently failed to attend a hearing in his case in February 1993 and, as he did not submit the medical certificate requested by the court within the specified time limit, an arrest warrant was issued. The applicant was arrested in connection with a traffic offence in October 1993 and placed in detention on remand. Numerous requests for release were refused over the next year and in January 1995 the applicant attempted to commit suicide. However, an application for release was refused by the Regional Court on the basis of a report by prison officers to the effect that the attempt was simply attention-seeking. Several further requests were rejected before the applicant was convicted in June 1995. The conviction was quashed in February 1996 and a retrial ordered. In May 1996 the detention order was quashed, subject to payment of bail of 10,000 zlotys. The applicant's appeals against the amount, in which he invoked the risk of suicide, were unsuccessful. He was finally released in October 1996 after bail had been lodged. He was again convicted in December 1998, the sentence imposed was reduced on appeal in October 1999 and a cassation appeal is pending before the Supreme Court.

Law: Article 3 – This provision cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to place in a civil hospital in order to have particular treatment, but the State must nevertheless ensure that a detainee is held in conditions compatible with his dignity and that his health and well-being are adequately secured, in particular by the provision of appropriate medical care. In this case, the applicant regularly sought and obtained medical attention and there is nothing to show that the authorities can be held responsible for his attempted suicide. Neither was there any subsequent failure to provide psychiatric observation – indeed, regular assistance was given. Thus, while the detention may have exacerbated the applicant's feelings of distress and anguish, it has not been established that he was subjected to ill-treatment of a sufficiently severe level to come within the scope of Article 3.

Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).

Article 5(3) – The period of detention to be examined is made up of two terms, the first running from the date of Poland's recognition of the right of petition (1 May 1993) until the applicant's initial conviction in June 1995 and the second from the quashing of his conviction in February 1996 until his release in October 1996 (the period from the conviction until the quashing being excluded as falling under Article 5(1)(a)). The total period is thus 2 years 4 months and 3 days. It does not appear to be contested that the principal reason the detention was ordered was the applicant's failure to comply with the time limit for submitting a medical certificate, giving rise to the belief that there was a risk of him absconding. This reason could initially suffice to warrant his detention but with the passage of time it became less relevant, particularly as he had already spent almost a year in detention before being re-arrested. Only very compelling reasons would justify the length of the detention and no such reasons can be identified in this case. The reason relied on were thus not sufficient.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 6(1) – The length of appeal or cassation proceedings should be taken into account in assessing the overall reasonableness, and in the absence of any evidence that the Supreme Court has given judgment, the proceedings have lasted over 9 years, including 7 years and 5 months from the date of Poland's recognition of the right of petition. This period cannot be regarded as reasonable.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 13 – In certain previous cases, the Court has considered that it was not necessary to examine a complaint under Article 13 when a violation of Article 6 had been found, there being no legal interest in re-examining the same subject-matter under the less strict requirements of the former provision. However, there is no overlap when, as in this case, the violation of Article 6 concerns the length of proceedings, this being a separate issue from the question of the availability of an effective remedy to complain about such length. While the Court has in the past nevertheless declined to rule on an Article 13 complaint in such circumstances, this case-law should be re-examined in the light of the continuing accumulation of applications relating to the length of proceedings, and it is thus necessary to examine the Article 13 complaint separately. The subsidiary character of the Convention machinery is articulated in Article 13 and Article 35(1) and the former gives direct expression to the States' obligation to protect human rights primarily within their own legal systems. While there is no prevailing pattern within Contracting States of remedies for excessive length of proceedings, there are examples which demonstrate that such remedies can be created and operate effectively. The correct interpretation of Article 13 is that it guarantees an effective remedy for an alleged breach of the right to have a court case determined within a reasonable time. In this particular case, the Government submitted that the aggregate of several remedies satisfied the requirements of Article 13 but did not indicate whether and how the applicant could obtain relief by having recourse to those measures. It was not suggested that they could have expedited the determination of the charges against him or provided him with adequate redress for the existing delays. Consequently, the measures referred to do not meet the standard of "effectiveness".

Conclusion: violation (16 votes to 1).

Article 41 – The Court found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the pecuniary damage he claimed had been caused by being held in detention for the relevant period. It awarded him 30,000 zlotys (PLN) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and also made an award in respect of costs.