BECKLES - United Kingdom (Nº 44652/98)

Judgment 8.10.2002 [Section IV]

Facts: The applicant was arrested in connection with the attempted murder of M., who had been thrown from a fourth-floor window. After having been cautioned by the police that his failure to mention something later relied on in court could harm his defence, the applicant stated: "I can tell you everything, he jumped." He was advised to wait until he was interviewed at the police station. However, after consulting his solicitor the applicant declined to answer any further questions. At the trial, the judge in his summing up told the jury that adverse inferences could be drawn from the applicant’s failure to mention during police interviews points relating to his presence at the time of the incident. The applicant was convicted and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. His appeal, on the ground that the judge had misdirected the jury as to the drawing of adverse inferences, was dismissed.

Law: Article 6(1) – Prior to receiving legal advice, the applicant had shown his readiness to account for his presence at the time of the incident, but was told by the police not to say anything at that point. At his trial, he explained his failure to reply to police questioning on the basis of the legal advice he had received. The trial judge emphasised to the jury that there was no independent evidence of what the solicitor had said, failing to refer to the fact that the applicant had been prepared to provide details and that he had initially manifested his willingness to co-operate with the police. The applicant did not waiver from his original explanation as to what had happened and did not seek at any stage to rely on new facts or circumstances which he might have been expected to mention had he chosen to answer police questions. These matters went to the plausibility of his explanation and, as a matter of fairness, should have been included in the direction to the jury. However, the trial judge failed to give appropriate weight to the applicant’s explanation for his silence and left the jury at liberty to draw adverse inferences from that silence, even if it was satisfied as to the plausibility of his explanation. The jury should have been reminded of all the relevant background considerations and directed that if it was satisfied that the applicant’s silence could not sensibly be attributed to his having no answer or none that would be stand up to police questioning adverse inferences should not be drawn. However, the jury’s discretion on this question was not confined in a manner compatible with the exercise of the right to remain silent.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously)

Article 41 – The Court considered that the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage. It made an award in respect of costs and expenses.